It has long been observed that misogyny, understood here in its broadest sense as hatred, contempt, or ingrained prejudice against women, is a common thread across most extremist ideologies. Yet despite its pervasiveness and corrosive impact, there is still no universally agreed-upon definition of the term.

While conceptual ambiguity is not unusual within the social sciences, many key terms are contested, this particular lack of clarity carries real-world consequences. The European Union, for instance, has no single, legally binding definition of misogyny. Instead, the concept is only indirectly referenced through adjacent policy areas such as gender-based violence, hate speech, and structural inequality. These references are scattered across disparate frameworks, lacking cohesion or legal consistency.

A full account of this legislative and conceptual gap lies beyond the scope of this article. Still, the absence is telling. It invites reflection on the social, political, and institutional dynamics that have allowed such a foundational concept to remain formally undefined, even as it becomes increasingly central to public discussions of violence and extremism.

Why all this matters?

On 23 May 2014, the United States experienced yet another act of mass violence. Fourteen people were injured and seven killed, including the perpetrator. What set this incident apart from the grim pattern of American mass shootings was its explicit ideological motive: the perpetrator’s inability to attract a romantic partner, paired with a hatred of women and contempt for sexually active couples. He left behind a manifesto and video diary blaming women for his perceived failures and calling for violent retribution.

Many now regard this as the first misogynist terrorist attack.

Public discourse quickly turned to the threat posed by those who identify as “involuntary celibates,” or incels. Yet notably, the perpetrator never self-identified with the term, despite its already widespread use in online communities like Reddit and 4chan. His manifesto and videos contain none of the now-familiar (contemporary) vocabulary of incel ideology; no references to blackpill, Chads, Stacys, or redpills.

Nevertheless, the underlying worldview, marked by sexual entitlement, resentment, and violent fatalism, closely aligned with the belief system that incel communities would soon codify and amplify. These forums embraced the attack as foundational, canonizing the perpetrator as a symbolic figure, often referred to as a “saint” or “martyr.”

Eleven years later, after countless initiatives, reports, campaigns, podcasts, videos, books, and public discussions, we are no closer to resolving or fully understanding this phenomenon. There is, however, a growing policy trend toward recognizing this incel-aligned misogyny as both a distinct extremist ideology and an acute terror threat.

Such recognition could prompt a rethinking of how we understand and respond to mass violence, especially in light of recent findings. One U.S.-based study, for example, found that nearly one-quarter (24%) of public mass shooters had targeted specific women, typically romantic or familial partners. Of those targeted, 80% were killed. Compared to other mass shooters, those who targeted women were more likely to have a history of domestic abuse or sexual offending, to be divorced or recently separated, and to display other distinct behavioral markers.

Yet as policy discussions move toward classifying incel-inspired violence within counter-extremism frameworks, questions remain about the potential consequences of securitizing inceldom as a group identity.

Much like earlier efforts targeting jihadist-inspired extremism, securitization strategies that frame identity-based subcultures as threats can produce unintended effects: they risk reinforcing grievance narratives, solidifying in-group identity, and accelerating radicalization. Incel communities already perceive themselves as culturally vilified and socially excluded; positioning them explicitly within national security paradigms may well lead to further entrenchment, not disengagement.

This is not to dismiss the severity of misogynist violence, nor to argue against public engagement with its causes. Rather, it raises the broader question of whether security-led responses are suitable for addressing a decentralized, memetic, and culturally embedded phenomenon.

As noted at the outset, no shared definition of misogyny currently exists, despite its clear relevance to the 2014 attack and the many copycat incidents that followed. This lack of conceptual clarity continues to hinder legal classification, cross-jurisdictional research, and coordinated policy action.

Recent efforts to define and categorize incel-aligned violence may indicate a shift toward more systematic engagement with misogynist ideology. But these developments remain uneven, and in many contexts, still lack foundational consensus. Whether future frameworks will converge around a codified understanding of misogyny remains uncertain. For now, discussions remain fragmented, both academically and institutionally, leaving the phenomenon under-defined, but increasingly visible.

 

References and Further Reading:

Costello, William, and David M. Buss. “Why isn’t There More Incel Violence?” Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology 9 (2023), 252-259, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40750-023-00220-3.

Lankford, Adam, and Jason R. Silva. “Public Mass Shooters Who Target Specific Women: An Empirical Analysis of Target–Offender Relationships, Timing, and Key Characteristics” Violence Against Women (March 19 2025), https://doi.org/10.1177/10778012251329370.

Lovett, Ian and Adam Nagourney. “Video Rant, Then Deadly Rampage in California Town” New York Times (May 24, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20171007184423/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/us/california-drive-by-shooting.html.

Lockyer, Demeter, Michael Halpin and Finlay Maguire. “The Emergence of the Incel Community as a Misogyny-Motivated Terrorist Threat.” Terrorism and Political Violence 37:3 (2025), 369-385, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2023.2296515.

O’Donnell, Catharina, and Eran Shor. “’This is a political movement, friend’: Why ‘incels’ support violence” The British Journal of Sociology 73:2 (2022), 336-351, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12923.

Rodger, Elliot. My Twisted World: The Story of Elliot Rodger (2014). Accessed via READ · Repository of Extremist Aligned Documents, https://read.expert/.

Witt, Taisto. “‘If i cannot have it, i will do everything i can to destroy it.’ the canonization of Elliot Rodger: ‘Incel’ masculinities, secular sainthood, and justifications of ideological violence” Social Identities 26:5 (2020), 675-689, https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2020.1787132.

Zimmerman, Shannon. “The Ideology of Incels: Misogyny and Victimhood as Justification for Political Violence” Terrorism and Political Violence 36:2 (2024). 166-179, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129014.